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Abstract 
Gun policy is a complicated, polarizing issue in the United States. My study focuses 
on Federal Firearms Licensees’ opinions towards policies designed to address illegal 
firearms trafficking. I chose Virginia because its high rate of private firearms ownership, 
large number of Federal Firearms Licensees, or FFLs, and the state’s relatively lax gun 
regulations render firearms trafficking a relevant issue in the state. Virginia’s lack of 
regulation on private gun sales both prompts gun trafficking and economically impacts the 
state’s FFLs. Thus, Virginian FFLs’ opinions regarding potential gun laws are important 
because of their niche in the market. To collect my data, I surveyed 580 Virginian FFLs 
using an online gun brokers’ database. My questions focused on the FFLs’ perceptions of 
how these policies would impact their business. I hypothesized that FFLs may favor 
increased regulations on private sales of firearms to equalize the costs of production 
between them and private sellers and collectors. My results indicated that approximately a 
quarter of respondents perceived an economic incentive to favor greater regulation of 
private sales, including universal background checks. I discuss research design limitations, 
future research suggestions, and policy recommendations. 
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Introduction 
 Gun policy, gun rights, and gun crime are enduring, intersecting, and controversial 
issues in the United States. Ideological fervor surrounds legal access to firearms with 
lawmakers and the public alike forming opinions on gun policies often without due 
consideration of empirical evidence. Furthermore, Americans uncontrovertibly perceive 
their individual right to bear arms unlike the citizens of other nations. Gun owning 
Americans often believe that their right to bear arms, grounded in the Second Amendment, 
is as inalienable as their freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to vote, or the 
right to privacy, owning guns for protection, hunting, shooting, collecting, or for their jobs 
(Parker et al. 2017; McDonald 1995). A quarter of American gun owners believe that their 
guns are essential to their identity (Parker et al. 2017). It follows that the literature 
surrounding guns and gun policy in America is dense and varied, from economic models 
of gun markets to historical studies of American private gun ownership since the 
Revolutionary War.  
This paper focuses on illegal firearms trafficking as a specific area of gun policy. I 
narrowed the scope of my research to Virginia because its high rate of private firearms 
ownership, large number of Federal Firearms Licensees, and comparatively few gun 
regulations make it an “easy case” as a source state for trafficked guns. The first purpose 
of my study analyzes Virginia’s Federal Firearms Licensees’ opinions of specific gun 
policies and laws associated with lower levels of firearms trafficking from states with those 
laws. I focused on the opinions of licensees since it appears that little research exists on 
these individuals’ perceptions of gun policies aimed at preventing gun diversion into illegal 
markets. Virginia’s lack of regulation on private gun sales both facilitates trafficking and 
Merrill  4 
economically impacts the state’s licensed firearms sellers. Virginian FFLs’ opinions of 
anti-trafficking policies are important because these policies either impact them directly, 
like ATF auditing, or indirectly through market distortions generated by private gun sales. 
I asked how license holders believed that these policies would impact their sales, rather 
than how they felt normatively towards the proposals. I sought to uncover whether any of 
Virginia’s licensees perceived an economic incentive to favor greater regulation of private 
individuals. I hypothesized that some FFLs would favor greater restrictions on private sales 
of firearms in order to equalize their costs of doing business compared with the negligible 
costs that unlicensed private sellers face.  
The fundamental structure of American government makes firearms trafficking an 
inevitable public policy concern. Our federal system, where individual states implement 
unique versions of gun policy, encourages buying, transferring, and selling guns across 
state lines. Multiple studies have found that the cost of owning a gun is rooted at least in 
part in the extent of gun regulations in a particular state, and that the differences in state 
gun laws prompt intrastate gun sales (Kanogh 2015; Kahane 2013; Koper and Reuter 
1996). The foundation of American government—federalism spread over a large 
geographic area—creates incentives for the illegal trafficking of firearms across state lines. 
“Criminal ‘gun trafficking’ essentially entails the movement or diversion of firearms from 
legal to illegal markets,” (Krouse, 2017, 13). An illegal transfer occurs whenever anyone 
transfers a firearm between states without using a Federal Firearms Licensee to move the 
gun, with a few specific exceptions including bequests upon the owner’s death.1 Figure 1 
                                                 
1 “No person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or 
licensed collector, shall transport into or receive in the State where the person resides (or 
Merrill  5 
illustrates the different ways that guns can move from the legal to illegal markets. 
Traffickers can acquire guns from private purchases from friends and family, straw 
purchases, or theft. They then transfer those guns across state lines without a Federal 
Firearms License and sell them to prohibited individuals, such as criminals or under-age 
youth, in the secondary market, often with a large mark-up (Knight 2013). Furthermore, 
this secondary market for firearms is substantial, with one series of Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms investigations reporting 84,000 trafficked weapons in a two-year 
period (Ibid.).  
Figure 1: Firearm Movement from Legal to Illegal Markets 
 
(ATF 2016) 
A gun’s “Time-To-Crime” or “TTC” is a measure of the length of time between the 
gun’s initial sale by a licensed dealer and when law enforcement recover it at a crime. A 
                                                 
if a corporation or other business entity, where it maintains a place of business) any 
firearm purchased or otherwise obtained by such person outside that State.” CFR 478.29 
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short TTC is one indicator of trafficking and is positively associated with a state’s crime 
gun export rate (Mayors Against Illegal Guns 2010). When traffickers smuggle guns across 
state lines, there is a high probability that law enforcement will find these guns at crime 
scenes.2Law enforcement traced thirty percent of crime guns in 2014 to a different source 
state from where the crime occurred (Everytown 2016). Furthermore, traffickers move 
firearms in a recognizable pattern based on state gun laws. Several researchers support the 
conclusion that criminals traffic firearms from states with fewer gun regulations to those 
with stronger ones (Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and Alcorn 2016; Kahane 2013; Kanogh 
2013; Knight 2013; Cook and Braga 2001; Webster, Vernick, and Hepburn 2001). Of 
course, trafficking patterns also depend on other factors besides state gun laws, including 
the economic size of trading partners, geographic proximity of states, and the presence of 
gangs (Kahane 2013).  
However, the link between reduced firearms trafficking and reduced gun violence 
remains mainly theoretical, with scholarly experts still unsure of the connection between 
the two (Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and Alcorn 2013). One of the most recent empirical 
studies directly connecting trafficking to gun violence comes from Johns Hopkins 
University in 2014. This study is notable for its linkage of Missouri’s 2007 repeal of its 
permit-to-purchase law for handguns, which included a universal background check 
requirement, to increased firearms trafficking and diversion of guns to criminals in 
Missouri along with a statewide 23% increase in firearm homicides (Webster, Crifasi, 
Vernick 2014). Thus, there is a general consensus among political scientists that firearms 
                                                 
2 Short TTC is not a perfect measure of trafficking, and prosecution is necessary to know 
whether a crime gun is actually a gun trafficked across state lines (Mayors Against Illegal 
Guns 2010).  
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travel from states with weaker gun laws to those with more restrictions, and at least some 
empirical evidence that trafficking is positively correlated with gun violence at a state level.  
Both government and the courts must address the externalities inherent in American 
federalism, and there is a need for careful balancing between protecting individual rights 
and limiting the social costs that these rights engender. Josh Blackman poses this balancing 
act for private gun ownership as, “Is the right of B to be free from fear of harm greater than 
the exercise of A’s constitutional right to keep and bear arms?” (Blackman 2011, 960). 
While Blackman focuses on the role of the courts as a mediator between liberty and social 
costs, this is a public policy paper, so I will leave constitutional law aside and focus on the 
idea that “a primary concern of every government [is] a concern for the safety and indeed 
the lives of its citizens,” (United States v. Salerno 1987). That being said, the Pew Research 
Center reports that the American public has been divided on the social cost vs. individual 
right debate in recent years, with similar percentages of the population favoring protecting 
gun rights versus controlling gun ownership (Parker, et. al. 2017). I assume that the national 
government wants to minimize illegal firearms trafficking and the social costs that it 
produces and is willing to implement policies affecting either the supply or demand within 
firearms markets.  
Illegal firearms trafficking becomes an externality when individuals commit crimes 
using trafficked weapons that they purchased or smuggled from another state with weaker 
regulations. Lee (2013) asserts that American federalism prompts policymakers to set 
jurisdictional gun regulations weaker than the socially efficient level, and that the 
externality can also cut in the opposite direction, when jurisdictions with stronger gun laws 
create cross-jurisdictional social benefits by preventing gun crimes in other jurisdictions. 
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“Gun policy in the United States reflects the costs associated with decentralization, namely 
cross-state externalities, and these externalities are particularly salient when there is 
significant diversity in gun regulations across states,” (Knight 2013, 200). I will thus draw 
on the empirical consensus that American federalism prompts firearms trafficking, and that 
this trafficking constitutes an externality in an economic sense when “trafficking patterns 
respond to differences in state-level gun regulations,” (Ibid, 201). Recent trafficking 
activity originating in Virginia suggests that this theoretical premise holds in that state. 
Of course, one solution to the federalism gun policy dilemma would be lowering 
gun regulations uniformly across the fifty states. By equalizing the market price of 
firearms, there would be fewer incentives for interstate trafficking, and presumably 
identical guns would sell for similar prices in all states. This approach dovetails with the 
perception that criminals are not responsive to state gun laws. In fact, large majorities of 
the American public, both gun owners and non-owners, believes that criminals will find a 
way to commit crimes whether they have a gun or not (Parker et. al 2017). One FFL from 
DK Firearms professed this view, expressing his reluctance to place blame for trafficking 
incidents on Virginia’s gun laws: 
“Like I said at the Chantilly gun show, it's already a crime to buy guns on VA with the 
intention to sell them in a State that has laws against these guns. However it is the 
responsibility of the state with the stricter laws to deal with the issue that they created. 
States like N.Y. have created a lucrative black market for illegal guns. Criminals will 
exploit these markets where ever they can. Look at prohibition, and the current war on 
drugs.” 
Merrill  9 
 The National Rifle Association, the most powerful interest group concerned with 
protecting citizens’ right to possess firearms, advocates for personal accountability by 
lawmakers in states where criminals use trafficked weapons. The NRA prefers stricter 
prosecution of criminals and enforcement of current laws, viewing new policies directed 
towards illegal trafficking with skepticism.  
However, 86% of Americans also believe that the ease with which criminals obtain 
guns illegally contributes “a great deal or a fair amount to gun violence,” a much stronger 
consensus of opinion than that surrounding legal access to guns (Ibid, 56). Interstate 
trafficking is one way that criminals illegally acquire guns, so it follows that preventing 
access to trafficked weapons and punishing traffickers is a public policy concern. This 
paper hinges on the idea that both enforcement of current effective policies as well as 
advocating for new measures to deter illegal trafficking are necessary to prevent the 
external costs associated with trafficking.  
ATF, Firearms Markets, and Firearms Trafficking 
United States firearms markets are prolific and complex. U.S. Federal Firearms 
Licensees are individuals who possess permits to manufacture, buy, sell, and transfer 
firearms as their legal business. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, or ATF, a 
division of the United States Department of Justice is a federal government agency tasked 
with regulation and oversight of firearms licensees. ATF has had jurisdiction over 
American guns since 1952 (Berlow 2013). The agency’s trafficking branch, which 
“investigates individuals and or criminal organizations that utilize firearms in furtherance 
of illicit activity or supply firearms to prohibited individuals…”, is only one aspect of its 
regulatory responsibilities (ATF 2016). In 2015, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
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Firearms processed 1,545,847 firearms (United States Department of Justice 2016). In 
2014, ATF found that over 9 million new firearms were manufactured in the United States. 
This statistic includes destructive devices, machine guns, silencers, short barreled rifles, 
short barreled shotguns, and any other weapon.3 These FFL broadly include three types of 
individuals: a dealer, a manufacturer, or an importer of firearms (Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms 2016). Dealers are classified in three types: Type 1 includes dealers 
in firearms other than destructive devices, Type 2 includes pawnbrokers in firearms other 
than destructive devices, and Type 9 includes dealers in destructive devices. Additionally, 
manufacturers may be Types 6, 7, or 10, and importers are classified in two categories 
based on what type of firearms and ammunition they deal with (ATF 2016). Figure 2 breaks 
down the various types of FFLs into their numerical classifications, from 1 through 11. The 
most relevant FFLs to this study are Types 1, 2 and 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 According to The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms 2016, the term “any other 
weapon means any weapon or device capable of being concealed on the person from 
which a shot can be discharged through the energy of an explosive, a pistol or revolver 
having a barrel with a smooth bore designed or redesigned to fire a fixed shotgun shell, 
weapons with combination shotgun and rifle barrels 12 inches or more, less than 18 
inches in length, from which only a single discharge can be made from either barrel 
without manual reloading, and shall include any such weapon made readily restored to 
fire.” 
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Figure 2: Classifications of Federal Firearms Licensees 
 
(ATF 2016) 
FFLs are the only non-governmental individuals with the ability to move a firearm 
across state lines. They also have the ability to order firearms whole sale and in bulk from 
a manufacturer without undergoing a background check. As of December 11, 2017, ATF 
had registered 134,853 Federal Firearms Licensees, with the largest category of FFLs being 
Type 01, dealers, at 56,199 (ATF 2018). Each of these licensed dealers connects a firearm 
manufacturer or distributor with the public.  
ATF is legally authorized to conduct one random inspection per year of each 
licensed business; however, anecdotal evidence from the FFLs I spoke with at gun shows 
suggests that businesses can operate for years without an ATF inspection. In 2015, ATF 
inspected only eleven percent of licensed business entities, a term that excludes collectors 
of curios and relics, the Type 3 FFL license, and about six percent of total Firearms 
Licensees (Berlow 2013).  If ATF wants to audit an FFL’s place of business, the process 
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can take multiple days and the FFL has to close his or her business for the duration of the 
inspection. The oversight requirements for federally licensed dealers are intended to 
prevent theft or illegal trafficking. Although ATF has the ability to randomly inspect any 
licensee’s business, the agency is unable to inspect all or even most of each state’s Federal 
Firearms Licensees annually due to limited resources.  
The scope of ATF’s regulatory jurisdiction is enormous, especially given the size 
of the agency. Political constraints impact the agency’s outcomes, manifesting themselves 
in ATF’s comparatively small budget and quantity of staff. Robert J. Spitzer, a political 
scientist from the State University of New York College at Cortland, suggests that ATF’s 
critics have shaped the agency into a “model” of inefficiency and inadequacy, “whose 
agents are ‘hamstrung’ by laws and rules that make it difficult or impossible to fulfill their 
mission,” (Berlow 2013). According to the agency’s own website, ATF’s budget was $1.26 
billion in fiscal year 2016 (United States Department of Justice 2017). To put these 
numbers in perspective, the Trump Administration’s proposed budget for the entirety of 
the Department of Justice in fiscal year 2019 is $28 billion, with more funding allocated to 
U.S. attorneys, $2.1 billion, than the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (Office of 
Management and Budget 2018).  
The existence of secondary firearms markets renders ATF’s jurisdiction especially 
difficult. Wright and Rossi’s (2006) survey of about 2000 inmates incarcerated in U.S. 
prisons found that most firearms transactions are informal, occurring outside of official 
channels. Furthermore, not all illegal firearms sales involve prior organization or planning, 
but rather occur as “the result of unforeseen or serendipitous circumstances,” (Morselli 
2012, 131). Gun thefts “undermine policies that attempt to staunch the flow of guns to the 
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black market through other trafficking channels,” and stolen guns often end up used in 
crimes (Everytown 2016, 18). Furthermore, supply side regulations to prevent illegal sales 
are less effective at preventing these types of informal transfers. Illegal sales can include 
under-age individuals or convicted criminals, both of whom are legally prohibited from 
buying a gun at a licensed business, purchasing weapons from friends and family or asking 
someone else to make a straw purchase for them (Webster, Daniel W., Vernick Jon S., 
McGinty, Emma E., and Ted Alcorn 2013; Koper and Reuter 1996; Wright and Rossi 
1986).  
A straw purchase occurs when someone purposefully purchases a gun for another 
person, who is prohibited from purchasing firearms himself or herself for a variety of 
reasons. A 2008 report by the Mayors Against Illegal Guns organization released several 
findings on traffickers and straw purchasing based on information from a variety of reports, 
studies, court documents, and other material, including court filings from over 1000 gun 
related prosecutions of alleged gun traffickers, straw purchasers, and others, and reports by 
ATF, the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the Center for Disease Control, gun industry 
material on trafficking and straw purchasing studies by experts. The report registered 
several key findings about U.S. firearms trafficking, including that traffickers target certain 
stores, some dealers sell to straw purchasers who have little knowledge of the firearms they 
buy, most straw purchases are done with traffickers in the store, and these straw purchasers 
typically buy multiple guns per visit. Finally, many stores recognize and reject potential 
straw purchases. The report suggests that employee training to identify straws would help 
prevent illegal sales (Mayors Against Illegal Guns 2008). However, most dealers exercise 
responsible sales practices, rejecting most prohibited customers.  
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Some lawmakers have attempted to more clearly define straw purchases and 
firearms trafficking in order to impose stricter federal penalties for these crimes. 
Specifically, Democratic members of Congress have sought stronger federal restrictions 
on firearms trafficking and straw purchases for years. Most recently, in the House of 
Representatives, Congressman Bobby Rush reintroduced a bill in February 2017 designed 
to codify straw purchases and firearms trafficking as federal criminal offenses, while 
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a different version of the bill in May 2017 to the Senate 
(United States Congress 2017; Congressional Research Service 2018). The bill would add 
penalties of fines or imprisonment of up to fifteen years for selling to straw purchasers or 
individuals intending to commit federal crimes of drug trafficking or terrorism, among 
others. The proposed bill remains in the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Security, and Investigations and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
The bottom line is that most Federal Firearms Licensees are in compliance with 
most federal regulations the majority of the time. According to Smart Gun Laws.org, 62 
percent of FFLs that ATF inspected in 2011 were in compliance with federal gun laws. 
That being said, a small number of dealers are engaging in questionable or illegal sales 
practices, either intentionally or accidentally. Slightly over one percent of licensed gun 
dealers sell almost sixty percent of crime guns traced back to a dealer (Everytown 2016; 
Smart Gun Laws 2016). 
The complexity of formal and informal firearms markets suggests that many 
approaches, including government regulation and oversight of dealers are needed to stop 
criminals from acquiring firearms. Furthermore, emerging empirical evidence rooted in 
ATF’s crime gun trace data supports this view (Braga et. al. 2012; Webster, Daniel W., 
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Vernick Jon S., McGinty, Emma E., and Ted Alcorn, 2013). Crime gun trace data “link 
each firearm recovered by law enforcement that was used or suspected to have been used 
in crime to the location, time, and circumstances of its first legal sale,” and in aggregate 
“describe meaningful patterns in gun trafficking, with diverse applications for focusing 
enforcement and creating a more responsible firearm market,” (Everytown 2016, 30-31). 4  
A 2012 study published in the Journal of Urban Health challenged skeptics of crime gun 
trace data by using new evidence to interpret illegal gun market dynamics, finding that on 
average, about a third of traced crime guns originate from other states. The study used data 
from surveys sent to special agents from ATF’s 23 field divisions, who were working on 
2,608 ATF gun trafficking investigations made from 1999 to 2002. This analysis of ATF’s 
field operations noted three findings about criminal acquisition of firearms. First, there is 
no one way that criminals acquire firearms; rather the illegal market is fed by corrupt 
licensed dealers, unlicensed private sellers, straw purchasers, residential theft, and theft 
from an FFL. This suggests that the illegal firearms market is not dominated solely by large 
organized trafficking organizations. Secondly, new guns are recovered disproportionately 
at crime scenes, which means that there is “an important role for close-to-retail diversion 
of guns in arming criminals.” (Braga et. al. 2012, 791.). The authors present evidence for 
this strategy from interventions in illegal sales practices and subsequent reductions in new 
crime guns in Boston, Milwaukee, Detroit and Chicago as well as a regression model fit to 
ATF trace data where “crime guns are disproportionally concentrated among newer guns.” 
(Ibid, 787). In other words, improving FFLs’ sales practices and law enforcement 
                                                 
4 Virginia enacted a law requiring law enforcement to trace crime guns in 2016 
(Everytown 2016). 
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intervening at the initial place of sale can be effective at reducing criminal acquisition of 
guns. 
However, there are definitely limits to using crime gun trace data as a source of 
trafficked firearms. Incomplete crime gun trace data means that “the true shape of the 
illegal market may be distorted or not apparent,” (Everytown 2016, 30). Complete and 
uniform trace data for the entire United States would not only silence skeptics of its 
efficacy, but also enable law enforcement to better understand and intervene in various 
secondary firearms markets.5 Braga et. al also suggest that enforcement agencies should 
look at a larger variety of potential indications of trafficking instead of only obliterated 
serial numbers, since crime guns come from such a large range of sources (2012). 
Firearms Trafficking and Virginia’s FFLs 
Virginia is an “easy case” for a state level study of firearms trafficking, since it is a 
net exporter of crime guns that traffickers purchase in Virginia and sell with high markups 
in states where firearm acquisition is more difficult (Mayors Against Illegal Guns 2010). 
Virginia exemplifies the aforementioned theoretical consensus for gun trafficking as a 
negative externality, where crime guns tend to move from states with weaker laws to those 
with stricter ones (Knight 2013). Furthermore, the state’s high rate of private firearm 
ownership makes Virginia even more appropriate for a study of opinions related to gun 
policy. Virginia is home to enthusiastic firearms owners, and the National Rifle 
Association headquarters is located in Fairfax, Virginia, giving the organization easy 
                                                 
5 Law enforcement in Virginia are currently required under state law to “take all 
appropriate steps to identify and trace the history” of confiscated firearms in connection 
with criminal investigations and submit trace information to ATF’s tracing system (Code 
of Virginia 2017). 
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access to Washington, D.C. As of February 2016, Virginia was home to 281,356 registered 
firearms, a total behind only California and Texas (ATF 2017). Furthermore, as of 
December 2017, Virginia was home to 4,097 Federal Firearms Licensees, including 
dealers, pawn brokers, collectors, and manufacturers and importers of both ammunition 
and firearms or destructive devices (Ibid. 2018). Virginian Federal Firearms Licensees are 
part of a large gun market from a source state of crime guns, and as such, their opinions 
are relevant to the national discourse on firearms trafficking. 
Illegal firearms trafficking is a salient issue in Virginia, with a major incident 
claiming headlines in Virginian newspapers in March 2017. The “Iron Pipeline” bust 
involved two dozen individuals, mostly from the Richmond area, purchasing over 200 
weapons in Virginia with the intent of selling them in New York, bringing illegal 
trafficking into the public discourse once again in the state (Smith 2017). These traffickers 
purchased the guns using straw purchasers in retail locations and gun shows around the 
state (NRA 2017). Virginia also exported the ninth highest rate of crime guns per capita 
from 2010 to 2015 (Law Center To Prevent Gun Violence 2017). Virginia is a prime 
example of the empirical consensus that federalism prompts interstate trafficking in crime 
guns, in recognizable, consistent patterns. Figure 3 is drawn from a 2010 report by the 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns organization about interstate firearms trafficking. It 
juxtaposes states with the ten highest crime gun export rates on the left, including Virginia, 
next to the states with the ten lowest crime gun export rate on the right, along with various 
gun laws associated with reduced crime gun exportation.   
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Figure 3: State Gun Laws in Top 10 Crime Gun Exporter and Importer States 
 
(Mayors Against Illegal Guns 2010) 
However, it is important to note that most illegal firearms trafficking, both interstate 
and transnationally, occurs in small batches rather than large shipments of firearms that 
criminals purchase and then distribute in bulk. The Small Arms Survey (March 2016) 
conducted a study of 159 prosecutions of international arms smugglers in United States 
courts, finding that, “Most arms trafficking is less flashy, less centralized, and even more 
difficult to stop,” (1). An earlier study found that “persons engaged in illegal gun sales 
appear to make quite modest numbers of transactions,” (Koper and Reuter 1996, 127). The 
same study described a few gun busts from twenty-five years ago that were eerily similar 
to the one that occurred in Virginia this past March. 
The debate about how to actually reduce illegal firearms trafficking or simply the 
diversion of guns to criminals in general, is hotly contested. The legal and illegal firearms 
markets and the regulatory agencies tasked with regulating them contain a wide variety of 
actors, from the various types of FFLs to legal and illegal buyers, ATF special agents, and 
inevitably, the judicial system. There is a broad spectrum of opinions on how best to 
prevent illegal market actors from diverting guns from legal commerce. As mentioned 
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above, the leading gun rights interest group, the NRA, favors stronger prosecution of 
criminals, especially straw purchasers, as preferable to new regulatory laws, and lobbies 
vehemently against new regulations at the national level (NRA 2017). As I will discuss 
below, Virginia’s Federal Firearms Licensees have various opinions on how to prevent 
criminals from acquiring weapons—or the impossibility of preventing illegal access to 
firearms. Gun markets’ complexity necessitates a multiplicity of approaches, while 
understanding the empirical evidence behind specific gun policies aimed at preventing 
illegal diversion is critical. 
Potential Solutions to Firearms Trafficking 
 A 2013 study by Webster, Alcorn, and McGinty, modeled the association between 
state gun laws and the per capita export rate of crime guns out of state, finding that 
discretionary permit-to-purchase laws were the most significant deterrent to interstate 
firearms trafficking. Their model, which used panel data from 1999-2012 to control for 
time invariant characteristics between states, also controlled for several key confounding 
variables, including the prevalence of gun ownership in a state, out of state population 
migration, and the number of people living near the border of states with strong gun laws. 
Notably, the authors also analyzed crime gun trace data in Missouri before and after the 
state repealed its permit to purchase law in 2007, one of the first studies to examine how 
changes in state gun laws may impact diversion of guns to criminals. They look at the sale-
to-crime interval, a measure of time between retail sale and police recovery, often used to 
indicate firearm diversion to criminals. After the law’s repeal, the sale-to-crime interval 
decreased for Missouri’s crime guns above the national average, and the percentage of 
crime guns originating in Missouri increased from a mean of 55.6% to 70.8% by 2011, 
Merrill  20 
while the proportion that originated from out of state gun dealers decreased from 44.4% to 
29.2% that same year (Webster, Alcorn, and McGinty 2013). A shorter time-to-crime 
interval suggests that potential criminals bought guns more frequently from Missouri’s 
licensed businesses, and the lower proportion of out-of-state guns shows that they relied 
less on trafficking from other states after the policy change. One limitation to this analysis; 
however, is the researchers’ use of the U.S. average national homicide rate as the primary 
counterfactual to Missouri’s firearm homicide rate. There were likely outliers driving the 
average country rate. 
This study is one of few using crime gun trace data from state law enforcement and 
ATF to suggest that a change in state gun laws can have a substantial impact on both the 
diversion of firearms to criminals and the proportion of crime guns imported from other 
states. However, their findings should be taken with caution, since crime gun trace data is 
incomplete at best. In a follow-up study, Webster, Crifasi, and Vernick (2014) note that the 
repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase law was associated with a 23% increase in 
Missouri’s annual firearms homicide rate. He points out that increases in violent crimes 
were evenly dispersed across Missouri, that this increase differed from a declining national 
homicide rate, that there were no policies directed at non-firearm homicides at this time, 
and that the change occurred simultaneously with an increase in the number of crime guns 
imported from other states and short time-to-crime guns in Missouri (Webster and 
Wintemute 2015).  
An earlier study by Webster, Vernick, and Bulzacchelli looked at 54 U.S. cities 
using data on state gun sales laws, a survey of law enforcement agencies practices of 
enforcing gun sales laws, and crime gun trace data to analyze the relationship between anti-
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gun trafficking policies and trafficking indicators. Their results indicate that strong dealer 
oversight combined with regular compliance inspections is associated with statistically 
significant reduced levels of intrastate illegal gun trafficking (2009). Implementation of 
policies aimed at FFL accountability would likely necessitate an increase in ATF’s budget 
for auditing activities. 
Regulations on private gun sales, including background checks and permit-to-
purchase laws can be effective at deterring illegal trafficking. Restrictions on private sales, 
“if properly enforced, could reduce trafficking by holding the private seller criminally 
accountable for an unlawful sale,” (Vernick and Webster 2007, 78). Webster, Vernick, and 
Bulzacheelli (2009) also found that regulation of private handgun sales was associated with 
significantly lower levels of trafficking in cities. Permit-to-purchase requirements for 
handguns, such as Missouri’s pre-2007 law, are strongly associated with reduced firearms 
trafficking (Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and Alcorn 2013). These laws take various forms, 
and can include other private sales regulations, like background checks, as part of their 
implementation. Empirical evidence also supports universal background checks as an 
effective way to prevent diversion of guns into the illegal market. States without universal 
background check requirements export three times as many crime guns than states with 
mandatory background checks for all handgun sales, controlling for population (Everytown 
2016).  
Registries are another way that private firearms sales could be regulated and 
traffickers held accountable. Registries would enable law enforcement to hold private 
sellers accountable for illegal sales and identify traffickers more easily (Webster and 
Vernick 2007). These laws would reduce the barriers to action that the Bureau of Alcohol, 
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Tobacco, and Firearms and other law enforcement currently face from incomplete and 
insufficient record keeping systems in most states. States with handgun registries export 
fewer crime guns per capita than those without them (Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and 
Alcorn 2013). Registries would help enforce compliance with regulations on private sales 
as well as reduce trafficking by clarifying the chain of ownership that ATF would use to 
track firearms (Ibid). This would dramatically increase its efficiency as an agency without 
increasing government expenditures from having to hire more staff. With a database of 
firearms, ATF agents would no longer have to contact firearm importers or manufacturers 
and then dealers, who may or may not be able to find the identity of the initial purchaser 
of a gun later used to commit a crime. Currently, “the lack of computerized records system 
for gun sales means that a crime gun trace that might otherwise be accomplished in a matter 
of seconds can take up to two weeks,” as ATF’s undersized staff contact one of thousands 
of separate databases kept by individual FFLs (Berlow 2013). This approach could improve 
ATF’s efficiency without requiring an increase in the agency’s budget. 
Mandating private firearm theft and loss reporting could also potentially prevent 
trafficking by helping ATF without placing additional costs on current Federal Firearms 
Licensees or the government. Proponents of reporting requirements, not currently 
mandated in Virginia, say that they would foster a sense of accountability and responsible 
citizenship among current firearms owners. Furthermore, required reporting of stolen or 
lost guns is associated with statistically significant lowered rates of crime gun exports 
(Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and Alcorn 2013). When a Virginia gun owner reports a 
stolen gun, law enforcement would then have a chance to intercept the thief and recover 
the gun before it appears in another state or locality. This type of policy is also attractive, 
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since personal accountability might appeal to a wider audience across the political 
spectrum.  
The aforementioned policies affecting both buyers and sellers of firearms are 
empirically sound ways to reduce illegal firearms trafficking. However, that is not to say 
that all new gun laws and regulations are effective at curtailing illegal sales practices. There 
are many policy suggestions that simply would not be effective. One of the Virginian 
traffickers recently prosecuted in New York City boasted about the weakness of Virginia’s 
gun laws, namely that he could buy multiple handguns in a short period of time, which 
caused some state politicians to call for the reinstatement of the one handgun-per-month 
purchase law (NRA 2017). However, despite some studies to the contrary, the literature 
generally suggests time limitations on handgun purchase laws do not impact interstate 
trafficking (Webster, Vernick, Bulzacchelli 2009; Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and Alcorn 
2013). Furthermore, strong regulations of licensed dealers alone or penalties for neglecting 
background checks or allowing straw purchases are also not effective at reducing 
trafficking (Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and Alcorn 2013). This might be due to the 
difficulty of enforcing penalties on dealers for poor business practices, especially in light 
of ATF’s limited resources and staff.   
Firearms Sales: FFLs vs. Unlicensed Individuals 
 In Virginia, along with many other states, Federal Firearms Licensees face 
significantly greater regulations on the firearms sales that constitute their livelihood 
compared to private salesmen or collectors of firearms. FFLs, who must renew their 
licenses every three years and pay license fees each year, must maintain records of all 
business transactions at their place of business, which ATF can access at any time, as well 
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as post signs and distribute warnings about federal laws pertaining to handgun ownership. 
FFLs must also conduct background checks, and if they are manufacturers or importers, 
identify firearms by engraving them with unique serial numbers.6 Private sellers of firearms 
are not required to conduct background checks on buyers, nor are they mandated to keep 
records of their sales. That being said, a significant proportion of criminals acquire their 
firearms from private individuals, while a much smaller population buy guns initially from 
FFLs. Thus, while some criminals do buy from dealers, many more get their guns from 
friends, family, or other private sales.  
FFLs and private sellers technically operate in the same market, but face drastically 
different costs of production. A person who wants to engage in the business of selling 
firearms must decide whether it is financially worthwhile to undergo all of the paperwork 
and regulations of acquiring and maintaining a license based on his or her business’s goals 
and mission. To muddy the waters further, there is actually no official definition of “private 
seller.” Since the 1986 Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, the definition of private sales has 
expanded, with exemptions for “collectors,” people conducting “occasional sales,” and 
individuals selling from a “personal collection” without limits on size (Berlow 2013). I 
have personally witnessed collectors and sellers without licenses display dozens of firearms 
for sale at gun shows, in a manner largely indistinguishable from licensed businesses. 
However, statistics about private sales of weapons do not differentiate between one-time 
transactions that occur between two individuals and private salesmen essentially operating 
as de facto dealers. Regardless, I will assume that market distortions exist, stemming from 
the higher costs that the government imposes on Federal Firearms Licensees for officially 
                                                 
6 Code of Federal Regulations. 2018. 478. 
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declaring their business. However, this market distortion theory only holds if at least some 
of the clientele of unlicensed collectors also buy purchase firearms from FFLs. I believe it 
is reasonable, since many private sellers regularly sell guns at the same gun shows that 
FFLs do. 
The primary purpose of my study was to uncover Virginian Federal Firearms 
Licensees’ opinions of policies associated with reduced firearms trafficking in terms of 
what those policies would cost their businesses. I then wanted to determine whether any of 
Virginia’s FFLs perceived an economic incentive to favor greater regulation of private 
individuals. Supply side measures to reducing illegal firearms trafficking are premised on 
the idea that increasing “the transaction costs in illegal firearm markets” would “thereby 
reduce the prevalence of illegal gun possession by criminals…” (Braga et. al 2012). 
Evidence from a study of Chicago’s recent handgun ban found that criminals’ demand for 
firearms is elastic, as their demand for guns decreases with an increase in price (Webster 
and Wintemute 2015). Thus, these policies target a criminal demand for firearms and raise 
the cost of acquiring a gun, with the goal of thereby reducing illegal movements of firearms 
and, hopefully, subsequent violence. I chose the policies listed in my survey questions 
based on those associated with reduced illegal trafficking from studies such as Everytown, 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns, and the National Urban League 2016; Webster, Daniel W., 
Vernick Jon S., McGinty, Emma E., and Ted Alcorn 2013; and Webster, Vernick, and 
Bulzacchelli 2009.  
Many gun policies, including many of those in my survey, target unlicensed sellers 
as the source of diversion of firearms to criminals. Private sellers have almost unlimited 
ability to buy and sell firearms without licenses, background checks, or other costs of doing 
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business. On the other hand, Federal Firearms Licensees legally must keep scrupulous 
paperwork detailing transactions, conduct checks, and in theory undergo regular oversight 
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Thus, I hypothesized that FFLs might 
favor greater restrictions on private sales of firearms in order to equalize their costs of 
doing business. The simple intuition behind my hypothesis stems from a basic 
understanding of economic principles: if the government is currently penalizing only 
licensees by increasing their barriers to entry and transaction costs, then there may be 
potential for Type 1 FFLs particularly to gain customers if unlicensed, private sellers are 
regulated more heavily. This idea hinges on whether FFLs perceive unlicensed sellers as 
competition operating with lower barriers to entry and business costs. I also asked FFLs to 
contact me if they had further suggestions or questions about my research and was met 
with a fairly large volume of feedback about which other practices might best combat 
illegal firearms trafficking in Virginia. 
Federal Firearms Licensee Questionnaire 
The questions that I asked the FFLs were focused on new policies and practices that 
favor greater regulation of firearms sellers both private and public; however, as I previously 
mentioned these policies are only a few of many potential ways to address firearms 
trafficking. The survey questions aligned with my hypothesis that Federal Firearms 
Licensees might favor greater regulations on private sales if they perceive private sellers 
as competition operating with lower barriers to entry and business costs. Additionally, 
some of the chosen questions also aligned with policies that were supported by previous 
research on illegal trafficking. Future research of FFL opinions could be taken in a variety 
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of directions, perhaps looking at how they view demand side policies for combatting 
firearms trafficking and other types of gun crime. 
I began my research with a qualitative study of FFL opinions at two separate 
Virginia gun shows. I tested potential survey questions at the Nation’s Gun Show in 
Chantilly and the C & E Gun Show in Harrisonburg. By distributing a small number of 
surveys and talking to dealers at shows, I improved question wording and better understood 
my population of interest. After spending several hours talking with Virginian FFLs, I 
gained a much better understanding of who these people are, their perceptions of outsiders, 
and the complexity of gun markets. I gained first-hand experience of how firearms sales 
occur at Virginia’s gun shows and how firearms businesses operate on a day-to-day basis. 
I spoke with FFLs that sold handguns, semi-automatic guns, and imported firearms.  
 I leveraged feedback from FFLs and our conversations to improve the wording of 
my questions. I next administered a survey on June 26 and June 27, 2017, to a larger 
population of 580 current or former FFLs using a messaging system on GunBroker.com, 
an online database and marketplace for firearms and ammunition. A licensed dealer that I 
connected with at the Nation’s Gun Show recommended that I use GunBrokers.com as an 
easy means of contacting hundreds of potential participants, via the website’s 
comprehensive internal messaging system. I emailed a short explanation and the survey 
link to every FFL listed as a Virginia resident on GunBroker.com. The surveys were seven 
questions long and required that respondents answer each question before moving on to 
the next question. I used Qualtrics, an online survey generator and data analysis program, 
to generate the survey and analyze results. Participants had one week to finish the survey, 
at which point Qualtrics finalized responses.  
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 Question 1 asked how mandatory background checks on private sales would impact 
FFL’s businesses. The second question on the survey asked the FFLs how their sales would 
be affected by a permit-to-purchase law on handguns. The third question asked how greater 
oversight by law enforcement would impact the business of respondents. The fourth 
question asked respondents how additional voluntary or required training of employees to 
recognize straw purchasers would affect their business. Question 5 asked FFLs how their 
business would fair if the government banned lower quality handguns. The sixth question 
asked how greater regulation of private firearms sellers and/or collectors would impact 
FFLs’ businesses. Survey questions 1-6 had answer choices listed on a five-point scale: 
Very Negatively, Somewhat Negatively, Neutral, Somewhat Positively, and Very 
Positively. The answer choices referred to the perceived economic impact of specific 
policies on a licensee’s business or sales. Thus, a response of Very Negatively indicated 
that the respondent believed that the policy in question would lower his or her sales or hurt 
his or her business significantly. The last question asked FFLs if their businesses would be 
affected if the state or federal governments took steps to reduce illegal firearms trafficking. 
Question 7 contained different response possibilities: Yes, No, I don’t know, and No 
Opinion, since it referred to the total quantity of guns sold by Virginia’s FFLs rather than 
total profit from sales.  
My survey was a crude interval measure that was heavily subject to both selection 
and non-response bias. Clearly, I cannot generate inferences on the entire population of 
Virginia’s Federal Firearms Licensees from selecting the views of a few FFLs on the issue 
matter, and there is no way of knowing the strength of respondent beliefs on the responses 
alone. The survey also did not subdivide categories of FFLs by license type.  
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Results 
A total of ninety-five individuals completed at least part of the Qualtrics survey, 
with eighty-four respondents finishing the full survey. The response rate was 16%. I 
analyzed the proportions of responses for each question and noted trends in response 
groupings. I expected to find a positive relationship between the question involving 
regulation of private firearms sellers and background checks for private sellers, but I did 
not know how strong the relationship would be. Additionally, I expected that the majority 
of FFLs would believe that their businesses would be negatively impacted by a ban on less 
expensive handguns and more oversight and inspections. Figure 4 summarizes trends in 
responses for the first six survey questions, with answer choices ranging from pale green, 
Very Positively, to dark green, Very Negatively. Question 7 responses are not included in 
Figure 4 because of its different set of answer choices and are located in the Appendix 
along with full results. 
Figure 4: FFL Questionnaire Response Rates 
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Not at All Response 
 Many respondents did not think that their businesses would be impacted by these 
policies. 62% of respondents did not think that additional mandatory or voluntary employee 
training to identify straw purchasers would impact their business. This may indicate that 
they already train employees how to recognize straws or that they do not believe that straw 
purchasers are a substantial proportion of customers—enough for training to impact overall 
sales in any way. Increased employee training to identify straw purchasers would be a low-
cost way for FFLs to help law enforcement reduce trafficking. Presumably, FFLs could 
cultivate a sense of civic accountability in their organizational culture by training 
employees to reject straws, which could increase sales from customers who appreciate a 
business entity with responsible practices. FFL sales could be impacted positively with 
straw purchase training if customers favor businesses with responsible practices or 
negatively if the number of rejected potential straws outweighs the benefits to civic 
accountability. 
These no impact results are particularly interesting, since many of the dealers at 
gun shows whom I spoke with indicated that they were approached by straw purchasers 
with some regularity. However, ATF leaves any specific training for employees to 
recognize straw purchases entirely at the discretion of the individual retailer, merely 
informing FFLs that they should “evaluate the purchaser,” according to one FFL whom I 
contacted. The same respondent indicated that the size of the store and degree of profit 
motive inherent in each individual sale are critical to whether an FFL might enable a straw 
purchase or not.  
Merrill  31 
A similar percentage of respondents, 51%, did not think that additional oversight 
by ATF would impact their business. These FFLs may believe that they already receive 
sufficient oversight by ATF and that additional auditing would not impact them. On the 
other hand, they may believe that their business does not engage in any questionable sales 
practices, and thus that greater oversight would focus on other FFLs who may be violating 
regulations.  
For the first question, regarding background checks on private sales, 43% of 
respondents answered Not at all. From an ideological perspective, these FFLs may favor 
limited government involvement in markets and believe in the inefficacy of government 
intervention. They may also be skeptical of whether mandatory background checks for all 
private gun sales is actually feasible, which is certainly a valid policy critique. These Not 
At All respondents might also not perceive a connection between a policy that would only 
affect them indirectly. They also might believe that they have a different customer base 
than unlicensed sellers.  
Approximately 40% of respondents answered Not at all to the fifth question, 
regarding a ban on cheaper handguns. Some FFLs simply do not sell low cost handguns at 
all, so the high no impact response rate is not surprising. This could also reflect response 
bias however, since the monetary value of a “low-cost, lower quality” handgun was not 
specified in the survey.  
31% of respondents answered Not at All to Question 6, suggesting that greater 
regulation of private sellers would have no effect on their sales, perhaps reflecting beliefs 
in the ineffectiveness of government intervention in the secondary firearms market.  
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One survey participant pointed out the difficulties of regulating the private firearms market 
from the supply side,  
“Shady or illegal gun owners, as always, will ignore the law and continue business as 
usual. Stopping legal guns will not stop this. (Analogy – Seattle put tax on guns and ammo 
to stop gun violence, instead – stores and jobs leave the city, illegal guns and ammo 
increase and gun violence is increased.)  ……..Tightening rules for the law abiding just 
add to the non-law-abiding… Chicago is another shining example of strong gun laws 
failing…  criminals have and keep their guns.” 
Ironically, this FFL’s reference to Seattle’s gun laws is a perfect example of how 
American federalism prompts legal gaps between municipalities and surrounding areas, 
which impacts illegal gun market activity. His Chicago reference appears relatively 
unfounded, as there is evidence that gun violence in Chicago actually declined with tighter 
supply side restrictions (Everytown 2016). Similar to this respondent, the FFLs that 
responded “Not at all” may believe that it would be impossible to regulate the private 
market and that thus their sales would not be impacted because nothing would change. This 
may indicate that some FFLs perceived the private sales and their own customers operating 
in different markets.  
Very Negative Response 
About 40% of respondents believed that greater regulation of private sellers would 
Somewhat Negatively or Very Negatively impact their businesses, which was Question 6, 
although only 14% perceived negative repercussions from mandatory background checks 
on private sales, Question 1. Unsurprisingly, 80% of respondents thought that a permit-to-
purchase requirement for handgun sales would negatively impact their business. I expected 
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high percentages of these answer choices from respondents, since a permit to purchase law 
and a handgun ban would almost certainly lower sales for dealers who sell handguns 
primarily, while greater frequency of ATF inspections and oversight could result in a 
business closure for days and reduced sales. The 20% of FFLs who did not think that a 
permit-to-purchase law for handguns would hurt their businesses likely sell few or no 
handguns or did not understand the question.  
Positive Response 
Fully 42% of respondents thought that universal background checks would 
positively impact their business, while 30% thought universal background checks would 
benefit their business. These are not trivial numbers. Furthermore, responses to Questions 
1 and 6 were related. The same dealers who believe that their business might benefit from 
background checks on private sales also feel that greater regulation of private sellers and 
collectors would benefit their business. This finding alone is not especially surprising—it 
just shows that the respondents understand the questions and are answering with a 
consistent line of reasoning—it is notable that twenty-three out of eighty-four respondents 
answered, “Somewhat Positively” to both questions. This lends at least tentative support 
to my hypothesis that some FFLs perceive an incentive to favor greater regulation of 
private sellers and collectors, barring any ideological reluctance to favor “gun control” type 
policies.  
The last survey question asked whether or not FFLs would benefit if the 
government at the state or federal levels made concrete efforts to reduce illegal trafficking. 
The question asked FFLs whether they would sell fewer guns as a way to gauge how 
government interventions against trafficking would impact their sales. Presumably if an 
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FFL does not sell fewer guns when a new policy is initiated, then he or she will not be 
opposed to the policy and may actually support it. 57% of respondents felt that they would 
not sell fewer guns if the government took steps to reduce illegal trafficking. This could 
mean that they do not think that anti-trafficking policies would have an impact on their 
individual businesses. However, like several of the other questions, this response could 
also indicate skepticism of government ability to regulate the market in general. Around 
31% of respondents were unsure of how government interventions to curtail gun trafficking 
would impact their business at all—a reasonable conclusion to make based on the 
complexity of legal and illegal firearms markets.  
The most interesting and perhaps revelatory conclusion from the survey results is 
the sheer scope of opinions in this population. As someone who values diversity of 
thoughts, I am encouraged by the varied opinions and reasonableness with which many 
FFLs confront this public policy concern. The Federal Firearms Licensees emailed and 
called me for days following the release of the survey on Gun Brokers.com with their 
suggestions for how to fix inefficiencies in Virginia’s gun policy from their points of view. 
While many of these Federal Firearms Licensees have the same basic interests at heart—
improving their business and selling guns to fellow Virginians—they certainly do not hold 
the same opinions about gun policy. Some of the respondents politely thanked me for my 
interest in their policy views, while others, understandably, informed me never to contact 
them again.  
Conclusions, Limitations, & Future Research Implications 
 My research attempted to uncover the opinions of Federal Firearms Licensees, the 
individuals centrally responsible for operating legal gun markets on a daily basis, on 
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policies associated with reduced illegal firearms trafficking. Understanding FFL opinions 
on these policies is important because of their nexus in gun markets, and policies aimed at 
gun trafficking impact FFLs directly or indirectly by clearing market distortions. To do so, 
I conducted an online survey of 580 FFLs operating in Virginia, chosen for its high rate of 
private firearms ownership and consequently large number of FFLs. The survey asked 
FFLs opinions on how greater regulations of private sellers, bans on cheaper handguns, 
and greater oversight of their businesses by ATF would impact their sales. I hypothesized 
that some FFLs might favor greater regulation of private firearms sales as a way to equalize 
their cost of doing business with unlicensed individuals operating in the same markets. My 
survey results indicated that approximately a quarter of respondents perceived an economic 
incentive to favor greater regulation. Furthermore, as expected, respondents generally did 
not favor hand gun bans, a handgun permit requirement, straw purchasing education, or 
greater oversight by ATF.  
 There are several limitations to this study and areas for future research. My survey 
was clearly victim to selection bias due to its online format and 16% response rate. Shih 
and Fan (2008) found that response rates to online surveys are 11% lower than mail surveys 
and that different populations respond to online surveys differently based on their comfort 
with Web technology. On the other hand, my 16% response rate is comparable to other 
surveys administered on online communities similar to GunBrokers.com. Petrovčič and 
Manfreda (2016)’s highest response rate for their survey of an online community was 
12.8%, using an email invitation combined with a plea for help from an authority figure, 
and they note other similar surveys with even lower response rates (Zillmann et al. 2014; 
de Valck et al. 2007; and Koo & Skinner 2005). While it is comforting to know that other 
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survey research has nonresponse issues, that does not mean that my results are less skewed. 
I simply have no way of knowing whether the individuals that responded to the survey 
constitute a representative sample of the total population of FFLs in Virginia, and they 
likely differed in meaningful ways from the total population. The proportion of my sample 
who answered Somewhat Positively or Very Positively to Questions 1 and 6 was likely 
biased upwards. 
Also, the database that I used to contact FFLs, GunBrokers.com, only contained 
contact information for the 580 FFLs in Virginia, some of which were no longer in business 
or whose licenses had expired. However, expired or retired FFLs are not expected to 
seriously alter the data of respondents, since most of those individuals most likely did not 
respond at all or responded indicating their ineligibility. My survey questions were also 
subject to response bias, since some FFLs may have answered questions solely based on 
ideology rather than from an economic perspective.  
 Exogenous factors certainly impacted my survey results, such as whether an FFL 
had ever been prosecuted for illegal sales practices previously. If a licensee had already 
been found guilty of illegal sales practices, he or she may have been reluctant to answer 
the survey questions honestly, especially to someone that he or she does not know or trust. 
The education level of respondents could also have skewed my results. Perhaps only more 
educated FFLs are aware of online databases like GunBrokers.com, and these licensees 
self-selected into my survey. More educated FFLs may possess numerous unobserved 
characteristics that could influence the answers they gave. Another way that differences in 
education could manifest themselves would be if respondents did not understand the 
question wording. This is an especially difficult factor to control for when surveys are 
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administered online, since respondents cannot ask clarifying questions to the survey 
administrator. I also should have specified what type of permit-to-purchase law I meant in 
the survey. There are multiple types of permit-to-purchase laws, whose requirements may 
go beyond simply buying a permit, some of which include mandatory background checks 
on unlicensed handgun sales, like Missouri’s former law, as well as record keeping 
requirements. 
Future research should focus on the opinions of Federal Firearms Licensees from 
states with more, fewer, or simply different gun regulations compared to Virginia’s. It 
would be interesting to note similarities in economic and ideological beliefs of FFLs in 
other states, specifically those with a history of being source or destination states for 
firearms trafficking, and to subdivide FFL opinions by license type. Another promising 
line of research could be a longitudinal study comparing FFLs’ beliefs before and after new 
gun regulations, namely those impacting private sales, were passed.  
By nature, survey research barely scratches the surface of the potentially endless 
questions that might be asked of respondents. In this particular study, I kept my survey 
brief in an effort to elicit more responses from a reluctant population—especially since 
respondents were contacted via email rather than face-to-face. If I could conduct the survey 
again, I would ask FFLs their opinion about instituting a mandatory theft or loss 
requirement for all firearm owners. As mentioned above, a mandatory reporting 
requirement can be effective at reducing diversion of firearms to the illegal market 
(Webster, Vernick, McGinty, and Alcorn 2013). I was able to ask a few FFLs what they 
thought about this strategy. 
One FFL stated,  
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“I think anyone should report any stolen or missing firearm, just makes common sense to 
keep them out the hands of minors or criminal's.”  
Another respondent, answered the same question saying,  
“I think anything that keeps track of stuff would be great, but again, without some sort of 
leverage, private parties will never self report. Unless there is something financial tied to 
it, or a penalty or perhaps even a reward system, I see it as mayhem.”  
There is likely a wide range of FFL opinions on whether or not owners should be 
required to report lost or stolen guns. There is also a distinct need for more information and 
understanding of the particular ideology surrounding the Second Amendment and how it 
engenders spillover effects into questions aimed at economic impacts.  
These surveys were intended to elicit responses about how certain gun policies 
might impact the sales of Virginia’s FFLs as well as how changes in the oversight and 
regulation of the private gun market, however hypothetical, might impact their businesses. 
Of course, that does not mean that respondents answered the questions without drawing on 
normative beliefs. Some respondents may have not approached these policies from an 
economic perspective because they believe that American citizens have the Second 
Amendment right to buy and sell guns without interference by the federal government. In 
other words, even if background checks for private sales may not have impacted or even 
benefitted an FFL’s business, he or she might still oppose government inference in firearms 
markets on its face. 
Another possibility is that respondents did not believe that the government could 
ever effectively regulate private firearms sales, whether they believed it to be a violation 
of civil rights under the Second Amendment or not. Regardless, it is still fascinating that 
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approximately a quarter of respondents indicated that greater regulation of private sales 
would benefit their business. It is economically logical for Virginia’s FFLs to favor 
equalizing costs within the gun market through regulation of private sales, even if this 
belief contrasts with other deeply held ideological beliefs about citizens’ right to own 
private firearms.  
 The multiplicity of FFL opinions on how to prevent illegal firearms trafficking and 
reduce criminal access to guns mirrors the public debate about these policies. Furthermore, 
the complexity of firearms markets necessitates a variety of approaches to dealing with this 
issue. As mentioned previously, criminals can potentially acquire guns from friends and 
family, dealers, gun shows, or through theft. Requiring FFLs to report lost and stolen 
firearms, record their sales, conduct background checks, and respond to ATF crime gun 
traces are all useful policies, but on their own, they are insufficient to protecting society’s 
interests. The additional supply side policies that I mentioned in my survey might be useful 
in reducing trafficking of Virginia’s guns to places like Brooklyn, but they cannot stand 
alone. The court system must improve prosecution of straw purchasing and trafficking 
violations. Giving ATF more resources to monitor dealers would also ensure that they were 
engaging in the “good” business practices that most of the FFLs at the gun shows I talked 
to assured me they were. If Virginia’s Federal Firearms Licensees would benefit from 
certain regulations of private sales, then some of the most ardent supports of individual gun 
rights might actually support new private sales regulations.  
Policy makers should take into consideration, first and foremost, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of all available policy options. If the legal and illegal firearms markets are 
complex, with various actors operating on both sides of the law, then there is room for a 
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wide variety of policies to interact cohesively and reduce gun crimes like illegal trafficking 
and the violence that they may precipitate. Amending the federal criminal code to include 
strict penalties for straw purchases and firearms trafficking is a logical first step for policy 
makers in this area. Prohibiting these actions would ideally deter potential traffickers and 
at the very least, enhance prosecution of individuals engaged in firearms trafficking and 
illegal purchases. There would also likely be political capital for politicians to support 
improved sentencing and prosecution from both sides of the ideological spectrum. 
 There should be additional research into the specific mechanisms at work in 
firearms markets across and within various states. It is widely acknowledged that 
“Differential access to illegal firearms markets suggests different methods for containing 
that market,” (Morselli 2012, 148). Knowing whether a firearms market is centered around 
specific sources or fed by a variety of private sellers would allow for more effective policies 
and practices by legislatures and law enforcement. Furthermore, policymakers should 
consider the potential support of FFLs for any regulation of private firearms sales, 
especially given the ideologically driven and divided nature of policies in our time. 
Policymakers must find support wherever they can, including seeking out the opinions of 
FFLs, the experts of their field, preferably before interest groups that have at most a third-
party interest in the gun market. Researchers should focus on identifying potential 
coalitions and whether they would agree on common policies to address the negative 
externalities triggered by American federalism. Who knows, dealers might become the 
unlikely allies of gun control advocates as researchers glean further understanding about 
how economics and ideology intersect in the American firearms market. Ultimately, we 
should not be reluctant to experiment with new public policies to address pressing social 
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and economic issues. We must be proactive as a society at improving our gun policy, never 
settling for complacency when American lives are at stake. 
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Appendix: Full Questionnaire Results 
Q1 - How would it affect your business if background checks were required for all 
firearm purchases (i.e. required of private sellers and collectors as well as dealers)? 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Very Negatively 5% 5 
2 Somewhat Negatively 9% 9 
3 Not at all 43% 41 
4 Somewhat Positively 29% 28 
5 Very Positively 13% 12 
 Total 100% 95 
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Question 2 - How would it affect your sales if a permit was required to purchase a 
handgun in Virginia? 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Very Negatively 52% 49 
2 Somewhat Negatively 28% 26 
3 Not at all 20% 19 
4 Somewhat Positively 0.00% 0 
5 Very Positively 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 94 
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Q3 - How would greater oversight of sales by law enforcement (i.e. inspections, audits, 
undercover stings, etc.) impact your business? 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Very Negatively 37% 33 
2 Somewhat Negatively 12% 11 
3 Not at all 51% 45 
4 Somewhat Positively 0.00% 0 
5 Very Positively 0.00% 0 
 Total 100% 89 
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Q4 - How much would additional voluntary or required training of employees to 
recognize straw purchasers impact your business? 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Very Negatively 10% 9 
2 Somewhat Negatively 16% 14 
3 Not at all 62% 55 
4 Somewhat Positively 8% 7 
5 Very Positively 4% 4 
 Total 100% 89 
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Q5 - How much would a ban on low-cost, lower quality handguns impact your sales? 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Very Negatively 26% 23 
2 Somewhat Negatively 28% 25 
3 Not at all 41% 36 
4 Somewhat Positively 3% 3 
5 Very Positively 1% 1 
 Total 100% 88 
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Q6 - How would greater regulation of private firearms sellers/collectors impact your 
business? 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Very Negatively 27% 22 
2 Somewhat Negatively 12% 10 
3 Not at all 31% 26 
4 Somewhat Positively 28% 23 
5 Very Positively 2% 2 
 Total 100% 83 
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Q7 - Would Virginia's licensed dealers sell fewer guns if the state and federal 
governments took steps to reduce illegal trafficking of Virginian firearms to other states? 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 6% 5 
2 No 57% 48 
3 I don't know 31% 26 
4 No opinion 6% 5 
 Total 100% 84 
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Cross Tabulation: Questions 1 and Question 6: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
